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 The Optimal Commons
 Barry C. Field
 Much of the work on problems of open-access
 and common-property natural resources has
 been focused on deducing and documenting
 the pathologies of inefficiency to which these
 resources are prone. Another important job
 has been deriving policy conclusions; the main
 one being, perhaps, that productivity will im-
 prove in proportion to the speed with which a
 change is made to individual, or something
 that behaves like individual, ownership. In
 making these prescriptions our kit bag of in-
 stitutional forms contains depressingly few
 items; in fact, it contains just two: common
 and individual. We have a situation analogous
 to one we had in the 1950s, when all goods
 were divided into two types: private and pub-
 lic. But the space between these two goods
 types was soon filled in with an infinity of
 intermediate forms. It is only fair that we fill
 up the comparable space in the property in-
 stitutions continuum.
 When the first English settlers came to New
 England in the seventeenth century, they
 chose to farm much of their land in common.
 Besides the individually enclosed home lots,
 these communities at first had common plant-
 ing fields, common meadows for harvesting
 hay, and common pastures.' Historians differ
 on why this was so; some take a cultural-capi-
 tal view that common land use was an institu-
 tional holdover from the settlers' land of ori-
 gin. Others lean toward the position that
 common land represented an institutional re-
 sponse to the conditions faced by the new
 settlers. We need not settle this issue here;
 whatever the correct explanation for this his-
 torical fact, it is certainly true that common
 land use is today totally absent from commer-
 cial agriculture in New England.
 From these facts we fearlessly deduce that
 between then and now a switch occurred from
 a system dependent on large amounts of com-
 mon property to one based exclusively on in-
 dividual private property. There is interest in
 knowing when this change occurred; we might
 like to examine, among other things, the eco-
 nomic forces that led to the change. But if we
 search through the documents to find the year
 when the change was made from common to
 individual in any of the seventeenth and eigh-
 teenth century agricultural communities of
 New England, we would not find it. Instead we
 would find a transition period during which
 time the land ownership pattern gradually
 changed. In some towns the transition was
 rather rapid, perhaps 60-80 years. In other
 towns it was slower, taking well over a cen-
 tury. And in Sandwich, Massachusetts, the
 complete transition took something like 250
 years. In the rest of the paper I want to sketch
 out one possible approach to modeling this
 phenomenon.
 The process of transition consisted of divid-
 ing the total land resource into smaller and
 smaller commons. Assume there are N farm-
 ers in a particular community. At one extreme
 they may all work the total land resource in
 common; at the other extreme they may des-
 ignate N separate plots, with each farmer cul-
 tivating a plot individually. But there are many
 intermediate positions. Let m be the number
 of tracts identified in the community, each to
 be worked by one or more farmers. Ruling out
 any reduction in N, then 1 - m ? N. Any
 particular value of m between 1 and N gives a
 mixture of common and individual property;
 each tract is owned privately by a subset of the
 N farmers but used by them in common.2
 Assume that land institutions currently in
 use involve a particular value for m; an in-
 crease or decrease in this parameter has three
 primary impacts on costs and outputs:
 (a) A change in resources devoted to de-
 fining and enforcing private rights. This in-
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 I These common planting fields are enclosed by a single fence
 but there are individual tracts within the fence.
 2 Among the Navajos the fenced-in range areas within which
 several permit holders graze their sheep is a clear example of an
 intermediate sized commons. See Libecap and Johnson, p. 82.
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 cludes such things as fencing costs, legal costs
 to determine title, costs of detecting and stop-
 ping encroachments, and so on. Call these
 exclusion costs.
 (b) Changes in the total value of common-
 property externalities in the community. How
 much change occurs as a result of smaller
 numbers of firms using each commons is un-
 certain. In some models of common property,
 such as that of Dasgupta and Heal, the extent
 to which the commons is used in excess of the
 rent-maximizing level depends on the number
 of users who are allowed access to the re-
 source; the smaller this number the less the
 overuse, even with no controls on use by indi-
 vidual members of the group. Thus, the larger
 number of commons areas into which the total
 land area is divided, the lower the overuse in
 each area and therefore the lower the aggre-
 gate overuse. As m approaches N, the overuse
 approaches zero. In the recent work of Comes
 and Sandler, however, full rent dissipation oc-
 curs as long as n > 1.
 (c) Changes in transactions costs of reach-
 ing x-limiting agreements among users of a
 commons. A major factor affecting these costs
 is simply the number of firms using a com-
 mons; thus, as this number declines it should
 be less costly to reach agreements to limit the
 quantity of variable input applied to the re-
 source.
 It is the balance between common-property
 externalities, transactions costs, and exclu-
 sion costs that determines the optimal com-
 mons. Define the following terms:
 N is the total number of farmers in the
 community;
 m, the number of commons;
 n(= N/m), the number of farmers per
 commons;
 ri, the amount of land used by farmers in the
 ith common;
 xi, the amount of variable input used in the
 ith common;
 F(x,r), total output in the ith common; Fx 5
 0, Fxx < 0, Fr > 0, Frr < 0; F is assumed to
 display constant returns;
 p,w, prices of output and the variable input,
 respectively;
 T(x,n), transactions costs of reaching agree-
 ment on levels of xi, T, < 0, T, > 0; and
 E(m), total exclusion costs, Em > 0.
 Assuming that all farmers are identical, the
 total land area will be divided into m com-
 mons, each of the same size with the same
 number of farmers. Under these circum-
 stances, total agricultural rent is
 Y = m[F(x, r) - xw - T(x, n)] - E(m).
 The T function is obviously a great sim-
 plification of a complex process. Individual
 reductions in use of a commons are in the
 nature of public goods, they confer benefit on
 every firm using the commons, not just to the
 firm making the reduction. Individual firms are
 better off to the extent that they can free ride
 on the reductions of other firms. Free riding
 could also be expected with respect to sharing
 the costs of the political skills and enforce-
 ment resources required to achieve agreement
 on reductions in x. For present purposes we
 assume these processes are solved, much as
 early club theory assumed away the problem
 of collecting contributions to the provision of
 the public good.
 Shifts in T function would come about
 through changes in the technology of group
 decision making. A reduction in the strength
 of complementary social institutions (e.g., the
 church in colonial times) might be expected to
 shift T upwards. A change from unanimity to
 majority rules would shift it down. Increases
 in the heterogeneity of the users of the com-
 mons could be expected to shift T upwards,
 since agreement would become harder to at-
 tain.
 The exclusion cost function, E(m), shows
 how total exclusion costs vary with the num-
 ber of commons. In simplest terms these might
 be fe cing costs, which would increase as the
 total land area was split into more commons.
 Exclusion costs, in the case of common re-
 source use, are subject to a strong public-goods
 type problem. The benefits of excluding others
 from a resource apply equally to all those who
 continue to have access. Thus much of the
 cost of excluding firms may be resources re-
 quired to deal with free riders.
 There are essentially two variables to ad-
 just, finding the optimal number of commons
 m and then determining the optimal x, or in-
 tensity of use in each eqmmons. We take these
 up in reverse order. Given m, both n and r are
 fixed, so the condition for optimal x is
 (1) pF, - w - T, = 0
 Since T, < 0, each commons is used at a
 point where pFx < w. Figure 1 depicts this
 solution: F*", shows returns in terms of reve-
 nues minus variable cost for a given size of
 commons, i.e., given r and n; T1 shows the
 transactions costs of achieving reductions in x;
 T1 has been set at zero at the open-access, or
 zero-return, level ofx. It could originate to the
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 Figure 1. Optimal use rate for a commons
 left of this if it were the case that some reduc-
 tion in x would occur automatically as a result,
 for example, of particular strategies adopted
 by the commoners.
 The optimal level of x is determined by the
 tangencies of T and F*, implying that the ex-
 tent to which a resource is overused,is a func-
 tion of decision costs. If no effort were made
 by the commoners to limit their use, x' would
 be the quantity of variable input applied. But
 at x' there are returns to be had from making
 and enforcing x-limiting agreements.
 The optimal number of commons can be
 found with
 dY
 = [F(x, r) - xw - T (x, n)]
 dm
 + m ax(F - Tx- w) Lam
 ar  an + -; Fr Tn ] Em = O, or am am I
 (2) F(x, r) - xw - T(x, n)
 + mFr ar an Tn) = Em.
 mr am am /
 The left side of this last expression is the
 gain in total rent from a change in the number
 of commons, while the right side is the change
 in total exclusion cost resulting from that
 change. The first three terms on the left side
 are the total rent earned on the representative
 common, while the last term is the change in
 rent on a representative common when the
 number of commons is changed. The forces
 tending to change the rent per common are a
 change in the amount of resource utilized by
 the common (ar/am) and its associated impact
 on output (Fr), together with the change in
 number of firms (an/am) with the resulting
 impact on transaction costs (T,). Both ar/am
 and an/am are negative, while Fr and T, are
 positive. In figure 1, an increase, say, in the
 number of commons would shift F* to F*2 and
 F*,. Transactions costs would change to T2
 giving a new optimal usage at x2. It is possible
 for the impacts on productivity and transac-
 tions costs of changing the number of com-
 mons to cancel each other out, leaving rent per
 common unchanged. In this case total rent
 would change by virtue of a change in the
 number of commons.
 The condition for the optimal size of m can
 be depicted graphically. In figure 2, the Z func-
 tion is the left side of expression (2); it consists
 of marginal income gains net of marginal
 transactions costs. Z1 is an initial situation,
 showing little income difference between few
 and many commons; Z2, on the other hand,
 refers to a later time when, because, say, of
 rising heterogeneity among farmers or a de-
 cline in the strength of complementary social
 institutions, a system of smaller commons is
 capable of producing much larger net rents
 than one of larger commons. The E functions
 show how marginal aggregate exclusion costs
 change with the number of commons; E1 is the
 initial condition and E2 refers to a new situa-
 tion in which because, say, of technological
 change in fence construction or the develop-
 ment of a more efficient technique for detect-
 ing trespassers, marginal exclusion costs do
 not rise as fast with an increase in the number
 of commons as was initially the case. As
 drawn, the optimal commons moves from mi
 to m2 between these two periods. How fast
 and far the optimal commons changes through
 time is apparently a function of the shapes of E
 and Z, as well as the speed with which they
 shift.
 There is no doubt that other approaches
 could be taken to finding the optimal degree of
 z 2
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 Figure 2. Optimal number of commons
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 commonness for using a particular natural re-
 source. The important point is that we have a
 continuum of land-use forms, not just two dis-
 crete types. While much of history may have
 produced changes in factors such that pro-
 gressively smaller commons have been called
 for on efficiency grounds, there may have
 been situations, such as the early agricultural
 settlements of New England, where the
 movement was in the opposite direction.
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